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I. The Groundhog's Day Opera
There is a distinct rhythm to anniversary reports on the
Telecommunications Act signed into law February 8, 1996. As soon
as the New Year's holiday fades, there appears a spate of news
stories. Their lyrics are now hauntingly familiar: "Television,
* Professor, University of California, Davis; Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute, hazlett@primaLucdavis.edu. This paper is based on the presentation made to the
March 6, 1999 University of California, Hastings College of the Law Symposium, "Mixed
Signals: Academic and Industrial Perspectives on the Telecommunications Act of 1996."
[1359]
Telephone Rates Going Wrong Way after 1996 Telecom Act,"1 "Law
Not Lowering Cable, Phone Rates,"'2 "Is This a Free Market? The
Telecommunications Act So Far: Higher Prices, Few Benefits."
'3
Each musical presentation stars three sets of actors: The
Policymakers, the Executives, and the Activists. The Policymaker sets
the table for the public policy opera by issuing a Great Boast: The
Telecommunications Act "will lower prices on local telephone calls
through competition. It will lower prices on long-distance calls
through competition. It will lower cable TV rates through
competition. . . . This is the biggest jobs bill to ever pass this
Congress."'4 Inside players from former House Speaker Newt
Gringrich to President Bill Clinton have performed this overture with
polish and bravado.5
The plot forms when conflict arises: Enter, the Activist [stage
left]. The Telecommunications Act is denounced "as an abysmal
failure."'6 The legislation has been nothing more than a cruel hoax-
"a big prank on consumers" 7-- or perhaps something more ominous:
"the forces of evil are overrunning the forces of good."
'8
Skirmishing ensues. News about prices is the hook-five-color
charts showing raw data on cable rates unadjusted for quality
improvements are the standard props-followed by a list of telecom
1. Deborah Solomon, Television, Telephone Rates Going Wrong Way after 1996
Telecom Act, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 6, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
DFile.
2. Jeannine Aversa, Law Not Lowering Cable, Phone Rates, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 3, 1999 (visited Jan. 12, 2000) <http://wire.ap.org>. See also Telecom Law Yields
Little Crossover, Higher Prices, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1; Pradnya Joshi
and Elizabeth Sanger, Telecom Reform: Big Talk, Little Action, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 1997,
at 39; Michael E. Kanell, Telecom Industry Lacks Expected Competition, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 9, 1997, at G2; Elizabeth Douglas, Phone Customers Still
on Hold, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 6,1999, at C1.
3. Mike Mills and Paul Farhi, This is a Free Market? The Telecommunications Act So
Far. Higher Prices, Fewer Benefits, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 19,1997, at H1.
4. Id. (quoting former Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD)).
5. Two standard openers: (1) "When Congress unveiled the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, its members proudly touted the deregulation measure's promise of lower
prices for consumers and new options for phone and cable services." Douglas, supra note
2, at Cl; (2) "When President Bill Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act on Feb. 8,
1996, he claimed victory for residential telephone and cable customers." Solomon, supra
note 1, at 1.
6. "'This law has been an abysmal failure to date,' said Gene Kimmelman, co-director
of the Consumers Union's Washington office." Aversa, supra note 2, at 1.
7. "'So far it's been a big prank on consumers,' said Robert Ceisler, executive
director of the Albany-based Citizens Utility Board. 'We've seen increases in long-
distance rates and very little competition on the local level."' Joshi and Sanger, supra note
2, at A39.
8. "'The forces of evil are overrunning the forces of good,' said Mark Cooper,
research director for the Consumer Federation of America." Kanell, supra note 2, at G2.
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Table 1.
TelecomAct.96.03
AutoWrite news stories on the Telecommunications Act of 1996
RealPlayer Audio in Vibrant Alto Italiano
Act Situation Character Dialogue/Action
(italics sung in Italian)
I Introduction Policymaker Law is magnificent,
competition at last!
II Plot Activist Prices are up, the law is a
sham!
III Complication Telecom Law IS magnificent,
Executive policymaker do you hear
me? Merely one tiny
adjustment!
Scene 2 [offstage The Merger! [deep organ
voice] chords] [consolidation beast
runs unchecked through
telecom forest]
IV Climax [graphic] Raw cable price data: Do
the policymakers know
what they're doing?
Scene 2 Congressiona Yes, we do! The FCC is out
1 Policymaker of control!
Scene 3 FCC Yes, we do! The Courts are
Policymaker out of control!
Scene 4 Activist No, they don't! The PAC
Money is in control!
V Denouement Policymaker Give us a chance, we'll have
some hearings. [pianissimo]
[Set up for next year's
story.]
mega-mergers. The Activist then takes center stage to belt out a dark
melody; the lyrical aria sings that the Act has led to consolidation, not
competition, and higher prices, not consumer cost savings. The
Telecom Executive is introduced as a supporting player, crooning a
ditty praising the far-sightedness of the Act in moving America
forward-with a coda pleading for special relief for one itsy bitty little
subsector (his). The "digital divide" (haves online, have-nots offline)
makes its timely appearance at the instant that whispers about
"competition in the business service sector" are heard offstage,
leading straight to the exciting Climax: The Congressional
Policymaker concedes some problems, but points to the FCC as the
source. The FCC Policymaker concedes some problems, but points to
the courts as the source. The Activist condemns the entire process as
a problem, and points to corporate PAC money as the source. The
charges and counter-charges build to a thrilling crescendo-and
silence! A pianissimo soliloquy by the Congressional Policymaker
softly allows as how, "[a] baby needs time to grow up," 9 assuring the
audience that, "[o]n balance, everybody agrees it's a heck of a good
law."10
The Grand Finale has yet to be written for this tour de force,
keeping the audience for yet another installment, next year, of the
1996 Telecommunications Act Anniversary Opera. (See Table 1.)
H. Intermission: Public Policy Analysis
While the opera makes great music, the truth about the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA) differs markedly from the
sound-bite kabuki arriving as reliably as Groundhog's Day. The
telecom marketplace is a big, complicated place, and the TA was a
big, messy bill. Not everything that the marketplace has produced
since February 8, 1996 is a result of the Telecommunications Act.
Sorting out today's information sector developments is difficult by
itself; attributing ongoing developments to reforms initiated in the
Act is difficult squared. The analysis becomes yet more complex
when it is extended to encompass problems encountered due to
reforms not undertaken by the TA: sins of omission. Finally, we
cannot evaluate this Act-or any act-without a standard. That is,
what does one expect an omnibus legislative package to achieve?
New laws reliably contain compromises and blemishes: How harshly
should we deduct for failure to achieve a policy optimum?
A. Grading on the Curve
Taking this last issue first, a baseline must be established. In the
telecommunications policy world, there have been but a handful of
major federal statutes to use for comparison purposes. Candidates
include:
9. "Complaints from consumers about higher prices and a lack of competition are
being met with pleas for patience. 'A baby needs time to grow up,' said Rep. Billy Tauzin
(R-La.), the new chairman of the House Commerce Committee's key telecommunications
subcommittee.... The nation's top phone regulator, Reed Hundt, says consumers
eventually will see big changes. 'The actual proliferation of widespread price-lowering
competition will be a two-, three-, four-year process,' Hundt said." Telecom Law Yields
Little Crossover, Higher Prices, supra note 2, at 44.
10. Mills and Farhi, supra note 3, at H1 (quoting Senator Ernest F. Hollings).
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* The 1927 Radio Act;
" The 1934 Communications Act;
* The 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act;
" The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act.
The verdict on these measures, as evaluated in consumer welfare
terms, is grim. The Radio Act allowed commercial broadcasters to
cartelize the emerging radio market, blocking competitive entry via
regulation." While the conventional interpretation of the Act is that
it was necessary to prevent chaotic interference over the airwaves,
recent research shows that the radio market developed in orderly
fashion under priority-in-use rules in property law. Radio listeners
ended up with fewer, less diverse listening choices after the "public
interest" standard-crafted by commercial broadcasters-was
enacted to allocate airwaves in the 1927 Act. 2 As Bruce Owen
writes: "Broadcast regulation began in earnest in 1927 .... From the
beginning, regulatory policies were heavily influenced by and
therefore beneficial to the industry they regulated. This was by
design.' 3
This anti-competitive outcome was cemented in place by the
1934 Communications Act, which brought the regulation of wireless
and wireline communications together under one umbrella agency.
This reorganization shifted interstate telephone regulation from the
Interstate Commerce Commission (where it had been assigned in
1910 by the Mann-Elkins Act) to the Federal Communications
Commission, where it joined the spectrum allocation regulation
moved over from the Federal Radio Commission (born in the 1927
Act). The regulation of long distance was well established under the
regulated monopoly model, and the 1934 Act only nominally
challenged this policy by directing carriers to interconnect when
ordered to do so by the Federal Communications Commission.
"But," Peter Huber writes, "the FCC never did so order."'14 In
practice, therefore, the 1934 Communications Act shuffled offices and
name plates, granting quasi-permanence to extant pro-monopoly
policies.
The 1984 Cable Act pre-empted local regulation of cable
television rates, allowing prices charged by operators to rise without
11. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133-75 (1990).
12. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 905-944 (1997); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, MASS MEDIA,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND DEMOCRACY (1994).
13. BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 79 (1999).
14. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE (1997).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
constraint following December 29, 1986 (i.e., deregulation was phased
in over two years from October 1984). While rates rose in the
deregulation period slightly faster than previously, quality also
increased, as operators expanded channel allotments and networks
procured more expensive programming. Subscriber growth increased
from trend during the 1987-88 upward price blip, evidence that the
rate control regime had not been suppressing quality-adjusted rates.
15
The legislation had clearly anti-consumer consequences, however, in
its provisions related to cable TV franchising. It required local
governments to license local cable entrants, and barred telephone
companies from receiving such franchises except in rural, sparsely
populated communities. These provisions clearly raised barriers to
entry in the sector, enhancing the emerging monopoly power of cable
operators.'
6
The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act modestly enhanced the opportunities for
competitive entrants in cable TV markets with rules allowing upstart
rivals better access to video programming.' 7 However, the measure's
primary thrust was rate reregulation. This program quickly proved
counter-productive for consumers, as cable systems responded to
FCC-mandated rate rollbacks by lowering quality. The net verdict on
the lower price/lower value package was rendered in the negative by
consumers themselves: subscriber growth sharply dropped under the
regulatory scheme. The outcome was visible even to regulators
touting the benefits of regulation, and prompted the FCC to quietly
relax controls beginning in late 1994.18
It is likely that at least three of these four telecommunications
laws produced zero net benefits for consumers-or worse. The 1927
Radio Act and the 1992 Cable Act appear to have positively harmed
consumers, raising the effective (quality-adjusted) price of service
delivered to customers. The 1934 Communications Act is not likely
to have had any appreciable impact at all, as it merely recodified rules
already in place. Hence, a judging standard suggests itself: If the
15. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable Television Rate Deregulation, 3 INT'L. J. ECON.
Bus. 145, 145-64 (1996).
16. National Telecommunications & Information Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Video Program Distribution and Cable Television, NTIA REP. 88-233 (1988).
17. See In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, CS Docket No. 95-61, 11 FCC Rcd 2060,
para. 207 (1995) (Second Annual Report); Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable
TV Markets, 60 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 609,609-44 (1995).
18. See generally THOMAS W. HAZLETT AND MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY
TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS (1997). See
discussion below for more detail concerning the effect of price controls and competition
on cable TV subscribership.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996 results in positive net gains for the
broad class of consumers-lower prices in quality-adjusted terms-
this evidence ought to render the Act a comparative public policy
"success."'19
B. What Did the Act Cause?
What market outcomes result from the Telecommunications
Act? The popular discussion of the Act has tended to view
marketplace events occurring after the law as being caused by the law.
Yet the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was clearly as much a
reaction to forces underway in telecommunications markets as it was
an effect on future developments. Whatever the intent or scope of
the legal change, the market possesses its own dynamics quite distinct
from the Act. The observance of revolutionary changes in
communications technologies world-wide is testimony to the
underlying momentum in this market.20 The challenge for analyzing
the effect of the Act is to judge how that pre-existing momentum was
diverted by the new law, which involves the delicate task of
separating market movements which are observed from some
hypothetical (counter-factual) alternative of what would have
obtained in the absence of the legislation.
For instance, suppose we decide that a primary goal of the 1996
TA was to promote local competition in telephone service. We then
observe that, since passage of the Act, competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs)21 have realized very high revenue growth. How do
we evaluate this information vis-h-vis the Telecommunications Act?2
Several CLECs existed prior to the TA, and state public utility
commissions directly regulate the terms on which such firms enter
and compete for market share-as they have since long before the
Telecommunications Act. On the other hand, the
19. While such a modest standard may provoke cries of "grade inflation," the
historical rationale for this scale is compelling. Moreover, were we to conclude the law a
"success," the policy debate will surely not be over. There is still much to learn from
further refinement (and grading) of the elements producing net social benefits in total.
20. See generally FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE (1997).
21. "Competitive" here refers to the entrants attempting to take market share from
incumbent local exchange companies ("ILECs"). Generically, local telephone service
providers are known as "LECs."
22. I assume that increased competitive local exchange activity results in lower prices
for consumers. In one dimension, this is straightforward: customers would not switch to
competitive providers unless they believed that they were being offered superior terms. It
is questionable in another dimension, however. If the entry of competitors were the result
of public subsidies or regulations incenting incumbent firms to raise prices (so as to
encourage entry), consumers could be worse off as per the package of policies resulting in
increased market share for entrants. This issue must be deferred for consideration
elsewhere.
Telecommunications Act ended the issuance of monopoly telephone
franchises by the states and directed the Federal Communications
Commission to promulgate a framework for states to follow in
crafting rules for competitive access to the local exchange.
A different problem involves increasing competition in wireless
telephone service. Journalistic and political sources have commonly
attributed declining wireless phone rates to the Act. Yet the rules
governing cellular, personal communications service (PCS), and
specialized mobile radio (SMR) licenses were created in FCC
administrative proceedings independent of the Telecommunications
Act. Moreover, the rulemaking for PCS, which has provided the jolt
of new competition by issuing additional wireless licenses beginning
in 1995, was formally begun in 1989. Similarly, newspaper stories
attributing rate increases for cable television service to
"deregulation" in the Telecommunications Act fail to note that there
was no deregulation of cable rates in 1997 or 1998 pursuant to the
Act, and cannot therefore explain cable rate increases during those
years. Moreover, cable rates were regulated by the FCC pursuant to
the 1992 Cable Act, making the attribution of rate increases to
"deregulation" a public policy non sequitur.
There are, of course, an unlimited number of reforms not taken
in the Telecommunications Act, but the key omission is this: Reform
of spectrum allocation. In a measure hailed as "historic,"
"pathbreaking," "revolutionary," and a "floor-to-ceiling rewrite of
the Communications Act of 1934," it is remarkable that fully one-half
of the regulator's telecommunications world-wireless-was left
essentially in tact. Spectrum is yet allocated by central administrative
process in the legal framework established in 1927. Licensees are still
permitted to transmit wireless services only as prescribed in federal
rules, entrants and new technologies still bear the burden of proof in a
rulemaking to consider whether enhanced competition is in the
"public interest." The upshot is that FCC allocation rules effectively
put a brake on innovative uses of spectrum and tax investments to
improve technical efficiency in providing wireless service to the
public. The Telecommunications Act was a missed opportunity for
liberalization of the structure of radio spectrum allocation, an issue
that has been dealt with elsewhere33 With this brief notation, the
analysis will now deal with what the Act did do.
C. What Did Cause the Act?
Since public policies are not constructed in a pristine world of
23. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REv. 217 (1996).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
August 1999] ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 1367
selfless reflection, distributional effects and political incentives
matter. Indeed, legislation does not occur without a political coalition
gaining the strength to convince legislators that certain rule changes
are in their interest. Such coalitions are most reliably powered by
material interest. Hence, this paper will examine the margins on
which congressional and executive policymakers actually operate, and
inquire as to the impact of the Telecommunications Act in meeting
expectations.
IL. Evaluating Marketplace Evidence
The economic policy embedded in the Act, explained simply,
says:
" Competition works better than monopoly.
* Rules should promote the former, discourage the latter.
" Less regulation will accomplish this-but not always, like now.
" To ensure competition, we will need lots of supervision.
" And considerable subsidies for universal service.
" Service to what, we're not sure.
Addendum:
" Supervision will be complicated, which is why Congress created
the FCC.
* The FCC will foul up, which is why God created Congressional
oversight.
" Communications lawyers and consultants are people, too!24
Legislation-like marriage-is a complex matter. Just because
you can see its blemishes (or howl at them) does not mean that the
thing is a flop. You view the matter in its complex entirety. And that
involves a number of questions. The primary issue may be posed
thusly:
(A) Has the Telecommunications Act of 1996 worked?
Prompting:
(B) What was the Telecommunications Act designed to achieve?
One must supply answers-or, at least, testable hypotheses-to
(B) before answering (A). I summarize the primary outcomes
designated by proponents of the Act25 in the following two
24. This line has universal resonance to members of the communications bar,
telecommunications policy consultants, expert academics, and government regulators.
Others may need to know that the reference is to the very brisk business in professional
services generated by the Telecommunications Act "deregulation" process.
25. There are many targeted goals of the Act which will not be analyzed in this paper,
propositions, offering tests of each.
Announced goal #1:
Increase competition in local & long distance telephone markets.
The Act was clear, and its proponents vocal, that the primary
purpose of the Act was to dissolve the restrictions limiting
competition on both sides of the telecommunications coin: local
exchange service, and inter-exchange (long-distance) service.
26
Indeed, the goal of increasing competition in either market was
assembled as a package deal. Opening the one (LD) was premised
on opening the other (local).
Test:
a. Have market shares for new competitors increased?
b. Have financial returns for incumbent firms been eclipsed by
returns for new competitors? This analysis uses stock market
evidence, estimating rates of return realized by shareholders in firms
in these markets during the period in which the Telecommunications
Act was debated, enacted, and enforced. Ranking telecom stocks by
their performance, 1994 -1998, reveals something about the actual
impact of the legislation.
Announced Goal #2:
Increase competition in cable TV markets.
The Act ended the cable-telco cross ownership ban, which made
it possible for phone companies to operate cable TV systems in their
local service territories for the first time (excepting the waivers
granted to rural telcos) since the FCC enacted a ban on video service
by telcos in 1970. The Act also offered minor policy reforms to
advance satellite TV competitors to cable, and phased out rate
regulation enacted in the 1992 Cable Act as of March 31, 1999.
Test:
a. Have market shares for competitors increased faster after the
Act?
b. Have rates, adjusted for quality, decreased after the Act?
including the V-chip, the Communications Decency Act, the policy changes on radio and
TV ownership, and universal service reform. All merit study, and are receiving it,
elsewhere.
26. "Minutes before signing the Telecommunications Act in February 1996, President
Clinton predicted the law would unleash a telecom revolution by tearing down
government-imposed barriers to competition-particularly in the local and long distance
phone markets." Brody Mullins, Critics, Backers of '96 Act Joust on Phone Markets,
NAT'L JOURNAL'S CONGRESS DAILY 1 (1999).
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In addition to the announced goals, major legislation typically
involves important unannounced, or even unintended, consequences.
The Telecommunications Act is not exceptional in this respect. I
summarize two apparent outcomes of the Act which were not
designated (either in the bill or by the bill's legislative proponents) as
goals of the Act:
Unannounced Goal #1:
Increase mergers between large telecommunications firms.
A reportedly unintended consequence of the Act is the observed
merger wave among major telecommunications service providers.27
Some commentators assert that the Act directly caused such
combinations, but the Act did not explicitly change merger law except
in relaxing ownership restrictions for AM & FM radio licenses.
Others, more plausibly, assert that implementation (or other)
problems related to the Act have moved firms to merge.28 This is the
unintended consequences view. However the merger wave is causally
related to the legislation, the public policy issue of keenest interest
concerns the effect of the industrial combinations on prices paid by
consumers.
Test:
Do investors anticipate that the mergers will raise prices, thus
enhancing returns for companies throughout the sector? This
evidence is gleaned from observing stock price movements around
the public merger announcements. The pattern of stock returns
evidenced during such windows allows us to distinguish the efficiency
vs. market power explanations.
Unannounced Goal #2:
Increase Congressional jurisdiction over telecommunications. The
line-of-business restrictions dating from the 1984 AT&T divestiture
were vigorously challenged in lengthy U.S. District Court proceedings
presided over by Judge Harold Greene. Standard theories of political
economy would predict that Congress preferred to have such policy
27. Whether the merger wave is more pronounced in telecom markets than in others is
unclear.
28. "Numerous legal challenges to the Act and its implementation have been raised by
the ILECs resulting in very slow implementation of the Act, and, in many cases, in no
substantial implementation of the provisions of the Act. Thus, more than two years after
the passage of the Act, there is very little entry and competition in local exchange markets.
In response to the apparent failure of implementation of the Act, there has been a wave of
mergers in the US telecommunications industry." Nicholas Economides, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact, JAPAN & W. ECON (Sept. 1998)
(manuscript on file with author).
debates before the Federal Communications Commission, a
regulatory agency overseen by Congress, for self-interested reasons.
29
Test:
Have federal political contributions from the regulated sector
increased, relative to other sectors, after the Act?
IV. Local and Long Distance Competition
A. Long Distance Telephone Service
The simplest analysis under the 1996 Telecommunications Act
relates to the progress made in enhancing competition in long
distance. There has been none. That verdict is easily reached
because the liberalization of long distance 3° related specifically to Bell
Operating Company31 entry; other LECs were already free to
integrate into long distance markets within their local service
territories. However, entry into long distance by the BOCs was
conditioned on the satisfaction of a fourteen-point checklist and a
"public interest" determination by the Federal Communications
Commission. In the three years following the Act the FCC denied
several such petitions submitted by various RBOCs, and granted
none. Hence, the conclusion: The Act has thus far done nothing to
promote competitive entry into long distance.
This does not render the policy senseless, however. It is plausible
that, (a) the protective licensing layer slowing RBOC long distance
entry was necessary to gain a majority to pass the
Telecommunications Act, and/or (b) the IXC-entry process in the Act
is working to provide an incentive for BOCs to open local markets.
This latter view claims that, given additional time, the "open local,
integrate into long" bargain will prove beneficial to consumers.
The first argument is assuredly correct. The fierce opposition of
the IXCs to pro-RBOC legislation would have very likely blocked
any legislation if compromise were not reached. The
29. For a review of this literature, see FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
30. Long distance service is sometimes called "inter-exchange service." Companies
offering such are IXCs.
31. BOCs is the acronym, although "RBOC" (for Regional BOC holding companies)
is the more common term. Following AT&T divestiture in 1984, seven RBOCs emerged:
Pacific Telesis, US West, Southwestern Bell ("SBC"), BellSouth, Bell Atlantic, Nynex,
and Ameritech. Through merger, the number of firms is being reduced. Pac Tel was
acquired by SBC, and the purchase of Ameritech by SBC is now pending. Nynex was
acquired by Bell Atlantic. Bell Atlantic additionally seeks to purchase GTE, the one
independent (non-BOC) local exchange carrier of comparable size to the RBOCs.
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Telecommunications Act, as introduced in early 1995, did not include
either the fourteen-point checklist or the "public interest"
determinations as requirements for RBOC entry into long distance.
These provisions were expressly added at the behest of the IXCs, and
were clearly intended to slow entry into long distance for some
number of years. In a political world, this was payment to the IXCs
for reducing their opposition to the bill. It worked to get the measure
passed, and worked thereafter to put a brake on competition.
Whether the price paid was too high is an interesting topic for
another forum.
The second argument, that the freezing of RBOC entry will
prove useful over time, is clearly speculative. By the FCC's own
admission, the policy has not yet succeeded in opening local
telephone markets-that is the premise upon which each RBOC
petition for Section 271 relief (permission to enter IXC markets
within their local service areas), has been rejected. The prevention of
enhanced competition in long distance has some cost to customers,
and that cost is being born upfront. In present value, risk adjusted
terms, the payoff in future competitive benefits will have to
compensate, with interest, for losses imposed early on. This is a
highly leveraged public policy position, particularly in light of
AT&T's recent acquisition of the largest US multiple cable system
operator, TCI. The merger signals AT&Ts decision to enter local
telephone markets with its own facilities, abandoning the regulation-
intensive approach theoretically available via the purchase and resale
of unbundled network elements from existing local exchange carriers.
It should finally be noted that competitive forces appear to be
affecting a reduction in quality adjusted rates within the long distance
sector, where output is increasing steadily.32 AT&T's market share is
now, by some measures, below 50%, which some take as evidence
that competition is increasingly robust 3 These trends, however, were
not created by the Telecommunications Act nor are they thus far
directly impacted by the Telecommunications Act, given the RBOC
shut-out on 271 petitions to the FCC.
B. Local Exchange Telephone Service
A great deal of attention has been directed to the truly massive
administrative process prompted by the Act in FCC rulemakings and
in federal court challenges to those rulemakings. This discussion
often leads to a comment on the futility of the Act in promoting local
32. The FCC web page (www.fcc.gov) features both rate and output data for the U.S.
long distance market.
33. The problem with this view is that a monopolist, or price setting oligopolist, has an
incentive to raise prices and voluntarily cede market share.
competition, with the various sides choosing up villains (see the








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
evidence is not so negative. Indeed, by one measure-market
share--competitive entry appears to be positively correlated with the
Telecommunications Act, and by another measure-stock market
performance of CLECs-somewhere between neutral and strongly
positive.
1. CLEC Market Shares
The financial status of competitive local exchange carriers,
fledgling entrants attempting to take market share from established
incumbent telephone carriers, is of interest. While the health of
competitors can be a misleading guide to the state of competition, in
this instance it appears a reasonable starting point. By the revealed
preference of consumers, prices adjusted for quality are declining
where competitors gain market share from rate regulated incumbent
monopolies.34
Annual CLEC revenues show a strong overall growth trend in
the 1993-98 period (Figure 1), and one could interpret the series to
accelerate in the post-Act period. The small sample size limits the
conclusions which may be drawn, but comparing the growth in CLEC
revenues in the pre-Act period vs. the post-Act period implies a
34. This abstracts from the possibility of implicit or explicit subsidies, as noted above.
Those issues, while interesting, form a separate discussion.
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strong increase in the growth rate. In the 1993-95 period, CLEC
revenues rose by $475 million, or 114%. In the two years following
the Act (1995-97), CLEC revenues grew by $2.2 billion, or 245%.
This trend is supported by press accounts which, as of March 1999,
claimed that "165 new phone companies [were] spawned by the
law. '35 This pattern suggests that the Act may have been beneficial to
the emergence of CLECs, and CLEC market share continues to grow
in recent quarters (Figure 2).
Figure 2.
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That conclusion is reinforced by the substance of the Act which
eliminated state laws granting monopoly franchises for the provision
of local telecommunications. While many states had been
independently abolishing or reforming such statutes and progress
would likely have continued, the federal pre-emption embodied in the
Act appears to have bolstered the trend. That the market shares of
the CLECs are still modest (2.5% of lines, 5.0% of revenues) may
constrain the total benefits produced thus far, but does not obscure
the direction of change.
35. Mullins, supra note 26, at 3.
2. CLEC Stock Market Performance
The performance of the small number of publicly listed CLECs
during the five year period, 1994-98, presents a mixed picture (Table
2). Only four companies can be charted throughout this period,36 a
span during which the Act was drafted, debated, amended, passed by
Congress, signed by the President, enacted by the FCC, and litigated
in federal courts. Since the Act ostensibly aimed to enhance
competition in the local exchange market, it is reasonable to conclude
that firms specializing in providing such service would enjoy windfall
gains during this period.
However, while all four companies produced positive returns for
shareholders over the period, two (Winstar and Intermedia) beat the
S&P500, which averaged annualized returns of 20.06 percent, and two
(ICG and GST) did not. This split may be somewhat misleading, in
that Winstar's performance was sufficiently in excess of the market
return as to make the performance of the portfolio of CLEC stocks
superior to the market as a whole. If, for instance, one had invested
$10,000 in each of the CLECs at the beginning of 1994, the equally
weighted portfolio would have been worth $179,226 at the end of
1998. The same amount ($40,000) invested in the S&P500 would have
been worth just under $100,000. Hence, capital gains in the small,
publicly listed CLEC sector were more than twice that for the
S&P500. Some of this supra-normal return is likely a risk premium
for holding CLEC stocks, which all have betas in excess of one.
37
Still, the CLEC returns appear to be somewhat in excess of the
market as a whole even with this adjustment.
A further bit of information can be gleaned from the stock
market evidence on CLECs. Despite the fact that there is only a
small sample of publicly listed CLECs throughout the relevant
period, the sample becomes substantially larger by period's end. This
growth is consistent with the idea that competitive forces are
increasing in the local telecommunications marketplace, although it is
not clear how much of the increase is causally linked to the Act. By
1998, we observe that a number of firms have been successfully
launched and are competing in local telecommunications markets.
36. And one of the four has only been publicly listed since March 1994. Many more
firms were listed for some part of the sample period, including several firms which were
delisted when acquired via merger. The CLEC firms listed are the only companies lasting
for the entire five-year period (or close to it), 1994-98, on the web site devoted to tracking
competitive local exchange carrier stocks: www.clec.com.
37. The CLEC stocks have betas in excess of one (indicating average riskiness). In
early 1999, Winstar's beta was 1.57, Intermedia 1.26, GST 1.91, and ICG 2.56. These
betas are not large enough to fully account for the superior returns of the CLEC portfolio,
although they can account for about two-thirds of it.
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Table 2: Publicly Listed Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
Company March IPO IPO $ 1194$ 1298 $ 94-98 Ann. % SP500
1999 Date Price Price Price % Growth Adj.





Intermedia 954 Mar-92 3.750 6.500 17.250 165.38 21.56 1.25
ICG 909 May-92 8.750 24.000 33.630 40.13 6.98 -10.89
Winstar 1360 Oct-93 3.500 3.060 39.000 1174.51 66.37 38.57
GST* 254 Mar-94 5.875 6.560 11.66 2.31 -17.06
IPO SINCE
JAN-94
e.spire 249 Mar-95 4.750 NA 6.380
Hyperion 592 May-98 18.380 NA 15.130
Allegiance 1137 Jul-98 13.750 NA 12.130
Telecom
Advanced Radio 214 Nov-96 15.000 NA 7.500
Telecom
US LEC 398 Apr-98 24.250 NA 14.810
Advanced 101 Feb-98 14.000 NA 4.190
Communications
Covad 1890 Jan-99 45.380 NA NA
Communications
Electric 429 Nov-97 15.000 NA 8.190
Lightwave
McLeodUSA, 2440 Jun-96 25.125 NA 31.250
Inc.
Level 3 17200 Apr-98 37.125 NA 43.125
Communications
ITCADeltaCom, 744 Oct-97 8.250 NA 15.250
Inc.
RCN 1560 Sep-97 13.000 NA 17.688
Corporation
Teligent 2070 Nov-97 25.625 NA 28.750
Nextlink 971 Oct-97 26.500 NA 28.375
S&P 500 466.510 1163.630 149.43 20.06
Source: Financial data from www.vahoo.com. The list of CLECs is found on
wivw.clec.com.
* GST 1994-98 returns measured from IPO date (March 1994).
Moreover, some of these firms have substantial capitalizations: Level
3 Communications, whose IPO was in 1998, is valued at over $17
billion, while Teligent, Winstar, Nextlink, Allegiance, Covad,
Intermedia, ICG, and RCN all have market caps of about $1 billion
or more. It is clear that the stock market takes these forays into the
local telephone "monopolies" seriously. By way of comparison,
throughout the years following the 1984 Cable Communications
Policy Act (legislation promising greater competition in local cable
markets), there never developed a single public firm-of any size-
whose business strategy focused on offering head-to-head
competition in cable service.
Taken as a whole, then, stock market evidence suggests:
Support provided CLECs in the TA was positive;
Support provided CLECs in the TA was modest;
Looking forward, substantial investors see competitive local
exchange service as a potentially viable opportunity for investment
capital.
C. Market Returns of Local and Long Distance Providers
To gain some appreciation of how the Telecommunications Act
may have influenced the most important industries "deregulated" by
the Act I calculated rates of return, net of the market return, for the
leading local and long distance service providers. The set of firms
examined in Table 3 include the three major IXCs (AT&T,
MCI/WorldCom, and Sprint) and seven ILECs (SBC, Bell Atlantic,
Ameritech, US West, BellSouth, Cincinatti Bell, and GTE). The four
CLECs publicly listed throughout the 1994-98 period are displayed, as
well as firms in related industries such as cable TV (TCI, Comcast,
Century, Adelphia) and wireless telephony (AirTouch and Nextel).
These firms were selected by the author, but no firm's returns data
were discarded. The most interesting data are the returns of the
IXCs, ILECs, and (already seen) CLECs. In these areas the major
firms are fairly easy to identify.
What does Table 3 reveal? Lacking more exacting event study
results, we observe that the no sector appears to dominate the returns
competition. While firms on average appear to beat the S&P500,
indicating that telecommunications shares exhibited relatively strong
growth in equity value during the relevant period, individual firm
returns are highly volatile and exhibit no obvious sectoral patterns.
The best performing large firm through this period is MCI which,
being acquired through merger by rival long distance provider
WorldCom, grew to a capital value in excess of AT&T's. AT&T,
while still the largest grossing long distance provider, under-
performed the market as a whole. Sprint was in the middle.
Among the large ILECs, four firms beat the market and two
[Vol. 50HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
August 1999] ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 1377
under-performed. The equally weighted average annual abnormal
return for the six firms is 3.25%, less than the equally weighted
average annual return for the IXCs, 4.92%, but greater than the
CLEC mean of 2.97%. These data can most easily be interpreted to
mean that the Act was not associated with any radical restructuring of
the telecommunications sector, as a dramatic shift in policy would
have resulted in markedly superior performance by one industry
segment or another. Incumbent monopolists and oligopolists were
not rendered unprofitable by the Act, nor were competitive entrants
showered with windfalls. These data temper the positive assessment
of the CLEC post-Act performance; general prosperity in the sector
unrelated to the Act may account for the positive (market adjusted38)
returns to CLECs, ILECs and IXCs.
V. Competition in Multichannel Video Markets
The effect of the Telecommunications Act in promoting cable
television competition is complicated by two events: the 1992 Cable
Act and the advent of digital direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service
(by Direct TVIUSSB) in June 1994. Both have been briefly discussed
previously, and a somewhat fuller treatment is necessary here.
The 1992 Cable Act offered both rate re-regulation for monopoly
cable systems39 and modest policy measures designed to enhance
competition. Chief among the latter was a provision making some
agreements between cable satellite networks (such as A&E or HBO)
and cable systems non-exclusive, so that new competitors in cable
markets could purchase programming to better attract customers.
Digital DBS service was initiated soon after the Act, and suppliers
publicly credit the program access measure with enhancing their
market prospects.
The primary impact of the Act, however, was in re-regulating the
rates charged by 11,000 cable TV systems. Rates in the industry had
been deregulated since 1987, when the federal pre-emption of local
rate controls in the 1984 Cable Act kicked in. The market-pricing
period, 1987-92, was replaced by re-regulation, commencing with a
rate freeze in April 1993. The FCC then, pursuant to the Act,
enacted two rounds of "rate rollbacks," 10% in September 1993 and
38. Adjusted Annual Growth Rate = AAPG = [(I+APG)/(I+SP500 APG)] -1.
39. A monopoly system was defined as one operating in a community where "effective
competition" did not exist. "Effective competition" obtained, according to the Act, with
the presence of a second operator which served 15% of potential subscribers and offered
service to at least 50%. (The presence of a municipally owned second system would trip
"effective competition" even without the service and coverage requirements.)
Approximately 98% of U.S. cable subscribers were served by monopoly systems, thus
defined, in 1992.
an additional 7% in July 1994.
Table 3.
Telecommunications Firms Ranked by Shareholder Returns,
1994 - 1998
Company Sector Market 1/94 12198 1194- Ann. Adju-
Cap Price Price 12198 Growth sted
($ MRil) ($) ($) Gains (%) APG
(%)
Winstar CLEC 1,360 3.06 39.00 1174.5 66.4 38.6
MCI IXC 157,400 13.75 71.75 421.8 39.2 15.9
Cincinnati ILEC 2,690 3.26 15.36 371.5 36.4 13.6
Bell
Ameritech ILEC 71,600 17.37 63.38 264.9 29.6 7.9
BellSouth ILEC 89,400 15.38 49.88 224.4 26.5 5.4
US West ILEC 27,700 20.03 64.09 219.9 26.2 5.1
Century CATV 1,140 10.63 31.72 198.5 24.5 3.7
SBC ILEC 102,900 17.93 53.39 197.8 24.4 3.6
Sprint IXC 29,900 28.44 84.13 195.8 24.2 3.5
AirTouch Cellular 53,000 25.25 72.44 186.9 23.5 2.8
Comeast CATV 23,300 20.74 58.69 183.0 23.1 2.6
Intermedia CLEC 954 6.50 17.25 165.4 21.6 1.3
GTE ILEC 62,200 27.29 64.52 136.4 18.8 -1.1
Bell ILEC 89,500 23.08 53.62 132.3 18.4 -1.4
Atlantic
Jones CATV 1,480 15.88 35.63 124.4 17.6 -2.1
Intercable
AT&T IXC 148,200 34.08 75.75 122.3 17.3 -2.3
Adelphia CATV 2,330 20.750 45.75 120.5 17.1 -2.4
TCI Group CATV 30,200 27.25 55.31 103.0 15.2 -4.0
ICG CLEC 909 24.00 33.64 40.1 7.0 -10.9
GST CLEC 254 5.88 6.56 11.7 2.3 -17.1
Nextel ESMR 8,160 42.00 23.63 -43.8 -10.9 -25.8
S&P 500 INDEX 466.51 1,163.6 149.43 20.06
The effect of the controls was rather dramatic: As seen in the
cable TV component of the Consumer Price Index, collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average U.S. cable bill was about 10%
lower in October 1994 than it would have been under the trend
prevailing when the Cable Act passed in October 1992. Yet, the
results were not encouraging for consumers.40 Despite the price
40. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Prices and Outputs Under Cable TV Reregulation, 12 J.
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reductions, cable subscriber growth did not increase-the expected
result were rates to decline while program and service quality stayed
fixed. Indeed, cable penetration and viewership, the leading output
measures in the industry, abandoned long-standing growth trends.
Even the recovery from the recession of 1990-91 could not sustain
cable household growth in the wake of the Cable Act, as seen in data
from the National Cable Television Association (Figure 3).
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
1 8Year
The harsh marketplace reaction to the controls enacted under
the 1992 Act led to major changes in the regulatory structure. By the
time the 1996 Telecommunications Act passed, the FCC had itself
decided to effectively deregulate cable TV rates. This began in
November 1994, when the Commission enacted the so-called going-
forward rules, allowing cable systems to raise rates substantially when
adding new program networks to basic cable menus. A series of
"social contracts" were signed with cable system operators which
further loosened controls. The liberalization quickly produced
results: Cable subscriber growth turned up again in 1995 (see Figure
3). The higher rates successfully discouraged perverse attempts by
cable operators to lower quality and defer investments in upgrading
REG. ECON. 173, 173-95 (1997).
Figure 3.










systems, activities which had rendered the previous "rollbacks"
counter-productive.
While many press accounts in 1997 and 1998 have associated
rising cable rates with the Telecommunications Act, the
characterization is incorrect. Moreover, the implication-that there
are consumer welfare losses associated with the rising rates-is
rejected by the evidence. The rising prices are clearly linked to
increasing demand for cable services, demand shifts fueled by quality
enhancements. 41 Importantly, this evidence is gleaned from consumer
behavior itself: growth trends indicate that households are more
likely to subscribe to unregulated packages than to price-controlled
cable packages. Since the former are nominally more expensive, the
implication is that subscribers perceive them to be of higher quality.
This is missed in reports focused exclusively on cable subscription
fees.
Even with the FCC retreating to fig leaf rate controls, the
statutory elimination of regulation may yield important additional
benefits. That is because it reduces risk in investments in cable
television system infrastructure. Such dynamic considerations are
especially important when cable operators are vertically integrating
into the internet access business. Given the generous bandwidth of
cable TV systems, high-speed modems can be cost-effectively
delivered to many of the 97% of U.S. households passed by cable TV
wires. (Of these, about 70% subscribe.) This recent discovery has
sent cable system values soaring; languishing at about $2000 per
subscriber for nearly a decade, 1999 transactions in the capital market
saw investors paying up to $5000 per subscriber. The cable euphoria
is tied to investor enthusiasm for the cable modem business; @Home,
the leading supplier of such service, was capitalized (in March 1999)
at $17 billion despite having just 500,000 subscribers ($34,000 per
subscriber).
While the breakthrough in data services effectively doubles the
cable TV revenue stream (typical cable subscribers pay about $35 per
month, whereas high-speed internet access subscribers pay this
amount once again), it requires substantial capital investments.
Existing plant must be upgraded, and such upgrades are costly.
Removing the risk premium associated with rate controls lowers the
cost of capital in the sector, allowing the necessary investments to be
made more efficiently. Conversely, the introduction of cable modems
further removes rate regulation from serious consideration as a policy
41. The fact that cable subscription prices increase over time is, ironically, evidence
that something other than monopoly pricing is at work in the marketplace. A monopolist
charges high prices, not rising prices. Indeed, for a monopolist to exploit market power by
increasing prices gradually would sacrifice profits.
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option. Constraining cable rates proved a failure even when industry
technology was more settled. In the current maelstrom, rate rules
encouraging efficiency-enhancing investments while preventing
monopoly price mark-ups are even more difficult to craft.
Table 4.
Largest Competitive Multichannel Video Program Distributors
Firm Mode Date 1999 Subscribers
Begun I
Direct TV/USSB satellite 1994 3,481,70542
PrimeStar satellite 1990 2,029,45243
EchoStar satellite 1996 1,168,02944
Ameritech overbuilder 1996 >200,00045
SNET46  overbuilder 1997 28,00047
GTE overbuilder n.a. 102,56748
Knology overbuilder 1994 80,06849
RCN overbuilder 1997 276,08850
OpTel SMATV 1993 217,59351
None of this discussion diminishes the importance of enhanced
competition. Quite the contrary: the failure of rate regulation
magnifies the importance of competition by taking away any
alternative. The Telecommunications Act expressly determined that
greater competitive entry would improve consumer welfare, and
codified the FCC's de facto deregulation by phasing out all cable
price controls as of March 31, 1999. The 1996 Act contained the
following measures to advance competition in multi-channel video
markets:
42. Figures from DBSDIsh.com: Leading Edge News & Info. on the Direct Broadcast
Satellite Industry (visited March 29, 1999) <http://www.dbdish.com>.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Ameritech Extends Cable Competition in Detroit Metro Area (visited March 9,
1999) <http://www.ameritech.comlnews/release/view/1,1753,2464/381_384_-390,OOhtml.>.
46. Southern New England Telephone, acquired by SBC Communications in 1998.
47. Email communication from SNET (July 15, 1999).
48. Top 100 MSOs at 103-05, May 1999, available in Cablevision Online: Database (at
<http:llwww.cablevisionmag.comldatabase/db-topco.asp>).
49. Kent Gibbons, Fast-Growing Knology 'Scares' Cable, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
June 22,1998, at 6.
50. As of June 30,1999 (SEC filing by RCN).
51. OpTel, Inc. Reports Results for First Quarter, OpTel Press Release (Jan. 14,
1999). SMATV (satellite master antenna television) suppliers serve residential
developments, typically on a contract basis. They are also called "private cable"
operators.
Local zoning banning DBS dishes was curtailed.
Local telephone companies were permitted to obtain franchises
from municipalities 52 or the FCC, the latter under the newly created
Open Video System model wherein most channel capacity would be
reserved for third party programmers.
It is unlikely that the DBS measure much affected the
marketplace, although DBS operators again publicly state that the
reform helps them compete. The latter provision has led to
substantial entry into previously monopolistic cable markets by
several firms (see Table 4), including telephone companies permitted
to own cable facilities in the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The
largest overbuilders are Ameritech, a Bell Operating Company being
acquired by SBC Communications, and RCN, an independent
telecommunications provider offering integrated service (local
telephony, video, and internet access) in direct competition with both
established telcos and cablecos. 53 The effect of the new rivals is
leveraged, as erstwhile cable monopolies respond to entry by
dramatically lowering prices and upgrading service quality.54 The net
impact, then, is that-from the competitive efforts of just these two
firms-somewhere in the neighborhood of 2.3 million households5s
face substantially improved choices in the multi-channel video
market, a little over 2% of the U.S. market.
While cable "overbuilders" (including many additional firms) are
as yet providing service to but a small fraction of U.S. households, it is
clear their impact is growing. As in local telephone service
competition, the level is modest but the trend appears positive. The
visible signs of success are more impressive in light of previous
failures to promote competition in the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts.
52. This overturned a policy adopted by the FCC in 1970 and codified by the 1984
Cable Act.
53. "RCN, the pesky telecommunications upstart that competes against local cable
operators, phone companies and Internet service providers in the Northeast and
California, announced recently that it closed 1998 with about 855,000 'service
connections,' or customers. While more than half of these, or 498,000, are internet access
subscribers, that still leaves 261,000 cable and 96,000 phone customers, up slightly from
the end of the third quarter." Alan Breznick, Fiber-Optic Highway Drives RCN's Success:
Feisty telecommunications company advances miles on East and West coasts, CABLE
WORLD, Feb. 15, 1999, at 16.
54. Bryan Gruley, It's the Phone Man At the Door-and He Has a Deal on Cable TV,
WALL ST. J. Sept. 22, 1997, at Al.
55. This assumes a 25% penetration ratio (subscribers/homes passed) for the two
overbuilders. While incumbents average about 65% penetration, garnering business with
an already well established existing supplier already typically lowers sales projections.
OpTel offers service to developments with 436,000 household units, increasing the
"competitive fringe" by at least this magnitude.
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The latter legislation included a measure to ban exclusive municipal
franchises, but there was no documented increase in overbuilding,
1992-96. Indeed, firms attempting to obtain competitive cable
franchises during this period were still met with a set of harsh
regulatory impediments.56 The 1996-99 period, by contrast, features a
growing competitive market segment spearheaded by two integrated,
well-capitalized telecommunications providers.
Table 5.
Growth In Multi-Channel Video Subs Before & After 1996 T.A.
1993 1995 1997 Pre-TA Gr. % Post Gr. %
DBS 602 2,200 5,047 265.45 129.41
CABLE 58,834 62,956 65,929 7.01 4.72
MMDS 400 850 1,000 112.5 17.65
TOTAL 59,836 66,006 71,976 10.31 9.04
Sources: Annual FCC Cable Reports; Sky Report (DBS).
Note: Quantities in thousands.
An even stronger growth pattern is seen in DBS, although it is
problematic to associate this growth with the TA. Indeed, as seen in
Table 5, the pre-TA subscriber growth rate (1993-95) exceeds that
evidenced following the Act (1995-97). One must be careful in
categorizing this change, however, as the actual units sold increase in
the latter period (sales growth is simply a lower proportion of an
expanding base). While the TA may not have launched DBS, it does
not appear to have retarded it, and the year-end 1998 DBS subscriber
total of 9.28 million57 presages an important development regarding
multichannel video competition: At DBS's 1998 growth rate, some
15% of U.S. households will subscribe to DBS in the first half of
2000. By the definition in the 1992 Cable Act, this will officially
designate the U.S. cable market "effectively competitive."
A final aspect of the Telecommunications Act's effect on multi-
channel video competition bears discussion. As seen in Figure 4,
recent growth trends in DBS and among cable overbuilders are
impressive. Alternatively, the MMDS58 trend is disappointing,
56. The case of FiberVision, a cable operator which unsuccessfully attempted,
beginning in 1993, to obtain a permit to compete throughout much of the State of
Connecticut, is instructive. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett and George Ford, The
Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the "Level Playing Field"
Statute in Cable T.V. Franchising (1999, unpublished paper on file with author).
57. DBS Investor.
58. MMIDS, multichannel, multipoint distribution service, is often called "wireless
cable."
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stalling at around 1 million subscribers. However, the tiny blip on the
horizontal axis-VDT/OVS-is most instructive. Video dialtone
(VDT) was the subject of the FCC's long-running regulatory
rulemaking (1987-1996), an administrative process which produced an
exhaustive record as to how the Commission should regulate cable
systems owned by telephone companies, providing for common
carriage of third party programming. The VDT proceeding did finally
succeed in licensing one provider-New Jersey Bell, a subsidiary of
Bell Atlantic-to operate such a system. The Dover, New Jersey
system signed up 1,250 subscribers before VDT was terminated in the
wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. (The system migrated to
the new model for video common carriage created in the Act, Open
Video Systems [OVS].)
The story of VDT is summarized by the following statistic: 1.47.
That is the ratio of VDT filings to VDT subscribers. (Indeed, it is the
high-end subscriber number achieved after nine years of
administrative procedures.) There were 851 Comments, Reply
Comments, and Petitions for Reconsideration filed by various parties
in the FCC rulemaking, which consisted of:
Notice of Inquiry;
Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, First Report & Order,
and Second Further Notice of Inquiry;
Second Report & Order, Recommendation to Congress, and
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
Memorandum Opinion & Order on Reconsideration and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
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Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 59
The OVS process has resulted in a few thousand competitive
cable subscribers, thus besting the total output of nearly a decade of
VDT rulemaking. But it is striking that the two most carefully crafted
models for competitive entry into local video markets, each
meticulously designed so as to produce consumer benefits, have
rendered the least amount of actual service to customers of the
competitive alternatives available. The lack of success by regulation-
intensive frameworks to open up local cable markets mirrors the
disappointing results obtained in the FCC's element unbundling
proceeding in telephony. The most successful CLECs, in the opinion
of investors risking capital, primarily rely on their own physical
facilities to provide local connections. With AT&T acquiring TCI,
the country's largest operator of cable systems, and then executing a
long-term agreement with Time Warner, the country's second largest
cable operator, the long distance leader has signaled its strategy to
provide independent (non-ILEC) local access. This apparent
abandonment of local reselling in favor of vertical integration into
facilities-based competition signals a verdict common to both cable
and local telephony.
VI. The Effect of Telecommunications Mega-Mergers
Perhaps no single development in the post-TA marketplace has
received more popular comment than the wave of mergers between
large-scale telecommunications providers. The following
announcements were key:
SBC would acquire Pacific Bell (April 1996)
Bell Atlantic would acquire Nynex (April 1996)
WorldCom would acquire MCI (October 1997)
AT&T would acquire TCI (May 1998)
SBC would acquire Ameritech (June 1998)
Bell Atlantic would acquire GTE (July 1998)
None of these attempted mergers have been blocked by the
antitrust authorities. (As of this writing, the first four have been
consummated and the final two are pending.) In addition, a much
larger string of smaller combinations has occurred, along with a rash
59. See Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 87-266 (1994). See
also, Affidavit of Thomas W. Hazlett, In the Matter of Implementation of Section 302 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Open Video Systems, FCC 96-99, CS Docket No.
96-46,11 FCC Rcd 18223 (April 17,1996).
of product development partnerships and marketing alliances. This
furious corporate restructuring in the telecommunications sector is
identified by Wall Street analysts as preparation for dramatic changes
in the way in which communications services are created, supplied
and sold, a theory supported by the contemporaneous explosion in
internet stock values. With respect to the large-scale mergers, the
anticipation is that, simultaneous to disintegration of key elements in
the telecommunications product market (with many niche players
offering innovative products), customers will increasingly shop for
branded, integrated packages of services. Large-scale firms can offer
such 'one-stop shopping' either by themselves integrating into
disparate product lines or by tying together the offerings of
independent service providers. Mergers and joint ventures are the
two sides of this coin.
The economic effect of such mergers and alliances is typically
theoretically ambiguous, and the standard method used by the
antitrust agencies to screen such combinations for legality is to
compare the likely benefits (greater efficiency in creating and
distributing products) against the likely costs (the possibility that
greater market concentration will allow firms to raise prices to
customers). Combinations likely to provide net efficiencies are
presumptively legal. This analysis, conducted in each case by the U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, has given the green light to
the four completed mega-mergers, and is still being conducted for the
SBC-Ameritech and Bell Atlantic-GTE mergers. There is evidence
provided by the capital markets, however, which illuminates the likely
efficiency implications of the mergers in question.
Here I examine the three most recent telecommunications mega-
mergers. The AT&T-TCI combination is added to the two currently
pending such that our analysis overlaps the subset of "approved" and
"pending" mergers. The methodology is that of an "event study," a
standard procedure in the financial economics literature. The basic
idea is to observe abnormal stock returns6° around the time a public
announcement takes place, seeing what investor behavior (driving
securities prices up or down) says about expected effects of the
announcement. Since investors have strong incentives to carefully
judge future changes in firm profitability from current information,
and because capital markets are relatively efficient in rewarding good
predictions while punishing inaccurate ones, stock price movements
are thought to embody sophisticated-and unbiased-projections.
60. Abnormal returns are actual returns adjusted for the return of the market portfolio
(here, the S&P 500). If, for example, an individual stock exhibits a return of 8% over
some period, which is exactly equal to the S&P 500 return over the same period, then the
abnormal return for the individual stock is zero.
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With merger announcements, stock price reactions are often
quite dramatic. Firms acquired in tender offers or hostile take-overs
typically see abnormal returns of 10-30% around merger
announcements. (Acquiring firms see virtually flat-zero abnormal-
returns on average.) What is most interesting for antitrust purposes is
to observe the returns to shareholders in firms competing with the
merging parties. If two firms in an industry merge (i.e., there is a
horizontal combination) and the stock prices of the n remaining
competitors increase in response, it may be reasonable to conclude
that the observed anticipation of increased industry profitability is
tied to the price-raising effect of an anti-competitive combination.
61
Where, conversely, competitor stock prices fall on announcement of a
merger between two rivals, financial investors likely evince an
expectation that competition will intensify, driving output prices
down. Absent equally convincing explanations for investor reactions,
this evidence is highly suggestive.
This logic is used to examine three recent telecommunications
mega-mergers. Industry competitors have been defined as large-
scale, integrated telephone companies which present the most direct
rivalry to other such firms (here, the merging parties) in the
nationwide competition for business and residential telephone
customers. The abnormal returns for one-day and three-day trading
windows surrounding the three merger announcements are displayed
in Figures 5, 6, and 7.
The financial evidence indicates that investors generally do not
believe that any of the three mergers will systematically raise profits
for their competitors, suggesting that prices to consumers are unlikely
to rise from enhanced market power. The strongest results are
evident in the AT&T/TCI merger, which is accompanied by strongly
negative returns for all of its large-scale rivals. The Bell
Atlantic/GTE merger announcement generates similarly negative
returns for the competitive cohort, but of lower magnitude. The
SBC-Ameritech merger produces mixed results, but the overall three-
day returns to competitors are negative, suggesting that rivals are not
expected to profit from the merger.
Taken together, these results support the efficiency view of the
mergers, rejecting the market power explanation. The restriction of
output generally associated with a merger which raises prices to
consumers will distribute gains across the entire set of horizontal
competitors, but such gains are do not appear to be anticipated by
financial investors in the three mergers analyzed here. This evidence,
61. The "take-over" effect may also cause returns to shareholders in non-merging
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SBC/Ameritech Merger Announcement:
Abnormal Stock Returns for Five Major Competitors
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Figure 7.
Bell Atlantic/GTE Merger Announcement:
Abnormal Stock Returns for Four Major Competitors
(Adjusted by S&P 500)
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together with formal DOJ approval of the previous mega-mergers,
leads to the conclusion that consumers will be benefited in the form
of lower prices and more efficient service provision due to these
dramatic changes in market structure in the wake of the
Telecommunications Act, whether or not the merger wave was
intentionally encouraged by policy makers.
VII. The Telecommunications Act and Political Contributions
The Telecommunications Act was the product of realpolitik.
Reforms of the size and scope of the Act involve compromises and
pork barrel bargains, such that an actual majority-or super-majority
to circumnavigate the veto power of various interest groups and
necessary committee chairs-can form a coalition to enact law. In
competitive rivalry in the political world, disparate interest groups
jockey for advantage, holding out so long as expected benefits exceed
expected costs. Often the interests of incumbent officeholders in
continuing contentious legislation in future legislative sessions (where
support groups can be cajoled or threatened, and electoral benefits
for the official thereby extracted), combines with the interests of
reform opponents (and the status quo is rarely without a considerable
number of friends-which is how it became the status quo) to block
legislation altogether. This, indeed, describes the twenty-year
legislative impasse which preceded the Telecommunications Act, as
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countless efforts to "update" the 1934 Communications Act had been
stymied since the ambitious reform efforts by Congressman Lionel
van Deerlin (Democrat--California), then Chair of the House
Subcommittee on Finance and Telecommunications, during 1976-80.62
To overcome such natural inertia it is helpful to have some
unifying motivation for Congress to act. A public emergency is the
classic motivating factor, a situation where the standard reasons for
not legislating are momentarily overwhelmed by political actors who
seize the opportunity (partly out of desire to grab credit for forging a
solution, partly out of fear of appearing unresponsive or "out of
touch"). Yet, no great crisis gripped the public in 1996; the issue of
telecom reform was scarcely more visible than in previous years.
Why did legislation pass at this moment, and not before?
It is difficult to pinpoint the motivating factors for legislation, but
a theory put forward here is that major telecommunications
legislation became more likely to pass as the political benefits to
incumbent officeholders themselves generally increased. There are
always benefits to distribute in legislation, but there are typically costs
associated with these; the transfer of rights from one constituency to
another is a standard example. The political gains from recipients are
offset to some degree by the opposition engendered among the group
which is taxed. What particularly motivates congressional and
executive branch policy makers are reforms bestowing cost-free
benefits on officeholders. One became available in
telecommunications law: Taking decisions about relaxing the MFJ's
line-of-business restrictions away from Judge Harold Greene, and
putting them in the hands of Congress and an agency it oversees, the
FCC.
Intense rent-seeking and rent-defending activities were taking
place in federal district court. This represented a lost opportunity
from the perspective of lawmakers. Since the mid-1980s, the BOCs
had been attempting to wiggle free of the constraints placed on them
by the consent decree ending the mammoth AT&T antitrust suit in
1982. That decree (supervised by Judge Greene) divested AT&T of
its local telephone service providers (the Baby Bells) and its
manufacturing arm, Western Electric. While the long distance
company (which remained "AT&T") and the manufacturing unit
were allowed to offer a variety of services as befit their business
strategies, the BOCs were restricted to providing local exchange
service. Specifically, the companies were barred from providing long
distance phone service, manufacturing phone equipment, or supplying
"information services" (which included video products such as cable
62. For a fascinating, detailed account of this episode, see ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET
AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (3d ed. 1982).
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television service).
The rationale for such restrictions was that the BOCs continued
to occupy monopoly bottleneck positions in the telecommunications
marketplace, and could-if allowed to integrate into otherwise
competitive ancillary markets-inefficiently exclude competition.
The restrictions were challenged almost at once by the BOCs,
however, and the challenge gained momentum following a 1987
Department of Justice report documenting that the
telecommunications market was changing so rapidly that the rationale
for restrictions was growing dubious. 63
Between that time and the mid 1990s there occurred intense legal
skirmishing. As described by Peter Huber, author of the 1987 DOJ
report:
[Judge Greene's] courtroom operated as a shadow FCC, an
independent authority that scrutinized, cajoled, hectored, and
prosecuted. There were hundreds of motions, complaints, and
other requests to enforce, modify or interpret. The Justice
Department issued thousands of advisory letters. The court
received over six thousand briefs. Thirteen groups of consolidated
appeals were carried to a federal appellate court in Washington.
The Supreme Court received half a dozen divestiture-related
petitions for review....
A 1995 Justice Department proposal to grant limited relief to
two local phone companies in Chicago and Grand Rapids occupied
twice as much paper as the entire consent decree that broke up the
national Bell System. This Son-of-Sam decree addressed network
information, billing services, and customer lists. It devoted four
paragraphs to regulations for marketing services to business
customers and another three to marketing to residential customers.
The Justice Department itself was to review and approve a written
script used by Ameritech to sell interexchange service. Two
paragraphs were required to spell out how Ameritech would list
local competitors in its white pages.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act put an end to all this. It
transferred authority over the key line-of-business restrictions to
the FCC, and it established a process and timetable for getting rid
of them all.64
While certain of the BOC requests were granted by the courts
(typically the D.C. Circuit overturning Judge Greene, who exercised a
63. PETER W. HUBER, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE GEODESIC
NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1987)
(known as the "Huber Report").
64. See PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC
AND LET THE COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 99 (1997).
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high degree of skepticism regarding the BOC filings), the activity
generated by interest groups fighting for position created demand for
judicial rulings rather than regulatory-or legislative-favors. This
state of affairs was suboptimal in the opinion of incumbent
congressmen or senators. As the likelihood rose that the BOC
petitions would be granted (i.e., the restrictions would be abolished),
Congress' incentive to enter the rent seeking game (while there were
yet rents to seek) increased. Importantly, this incentive was felt by
incumbents of either party, unified by an interest in promoting
greater campaign support from interest groups, as well as in fostering
greater intimacy with corporate employers likely to be hiring after
officeholders exited public life.
The upshot is that enacting the Telecommunications Act, moving
the marketplace back to Congress's line-of-business restrictions, was a
popular, bipartisan objective among legislators. This likely propelled
Overall
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legislation which had been stalled for decades. And we may now
judge whether Congress's self-interested objective has been met.
The evidence suggests that it has. In both the 1996 and 1998
election cycles, federal political contributions by telecommunications
firms rose both absolutely and adjusted for the overall rise in political
giving, according to data supplied by the Center for Responsive
Politics (Figure 8.) Indeed, in both categories (soft money and PAC
donations) in both cycles, telecommunications spending increased.
This 4 for 4 batting average could be achieved by random chance just
6 times in 100. Add to this quantifiable political gain the fact that the
Telecommunications Act has provided a platform for an
exceptionally newsworthy set of public issues, from the big ticket
competitive issues discussed in this paper to the hot button social
issues in the Act including TV violence (and the V-chip) and internet
indecency. Even failings attributed (rightly or wrongly) to the Act
(say, cable rate increases) have afforded the opportunity for high-
profile hearings and voluminous incumbent publicity. It is not
particularly ambitious to label the Telecommunications Act close to
an unmitigated political success. 65
VIII. A Mid-Term Grade
A sober assessment of the major economic provisions of the 1996
Telecommunications Act reveals that the legislation scores at the top
of its class on standardized tests. In the principle markets the Act
reformed, prices are not rising in quality-adjusted terms, and
increasingly customers are facing choices between service suppliers.
More importantly, the capital markets-always looking to the
future-indicate that these competitive forces will intensify. Billions
of dollars are now betting that firms offering competitive local
telephone and cable service will prosper and grow. Whatever the
impatience justifiably exhibited with monopoly services in the
interim, it must be pointed out that previous legislation-two much
heralded Cable Acts in 1984 and 1992, for instance-never succeeded
in producing the degree of local telecommunications service rivalry
that now exists on the competitive fringe.
How important the 1996 legislation was in promoting current and
looming benefits is a difficult question. Unfortunately, market forces
are not labeled, Made in the Act. But having observed previous
"reforms" produce demonstrably counter-productive impacts for
consumers, it is telling that such problems have not yet arisen in the
65. Not entirely unmitigated, however. The Chair of the Senate Commerce
Committee and key sponsor of the TA, Larry Pressler (R-SD), was the only incumbent
senator defeated for reelection in 1996. His opponent raised the TA as a campaign issue.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 3-YEAR TOTE BOARD
Area Results Comment
Long Distance Zero Every RBOC 271 petition denied.
Competition
Local Exchange Modest Acceleration in CLEC revenues,
Competition Success growing to 5.0% of LEC total in 98-IV.
CLECs attracting capital, and 5-year
returns beat S&P 500.
Multi-channel Video Modest DBS gains, and Ameritech and RCN
Competition Success emerge as large scale overbuilders.
Competitors at 15% market share.
Telecommunications Success Financial markets indicate that
Mega Mergers investors anticipate competition will
intensify, as firms restructure for
national brands competition.
Policymaking Strong Telecom contributions to federal
Competition Success candidates and parties increases in 96
and 98 election cycles.
wake of this legislation. Indeed, the failings of the
Telecommunications in promoting competition are likely to be found
in its conservatism. The measure did not liberalize radio spectrum
allocation nor move aggressively to promote long distance entry by
the RBOCs. It mandated extensive "safeguards," and led the FCC to
micro-manage reforms so tightly that the leading U.S. regulatory
economist, Alfred Kahn, has proposed "deregulating the process of
deregulation."
66
The cautious approach taken was political compromise in
action-often heard in Washington as one word. Still, the
Telecommunications Act put the government explicitly on the side of
competition, a bold move in markets where government has
traditionally operated on the "natural monopoly" assumption. That
the opportunity to legislate was sweetened by the lure of taking back
the brisk regulatory business brewing in Judge Greene's courtroom
does not diminish the reform, but helps to rationally explain it.
66. ALFRED KAHN, LETTING GO: DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION
OR KLEPTOCRATS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY DISINGENUOUSNESS
(1998).
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